Interfax's Interview

 Historically, with which U.S. administration has it been easier for Moscow to interact with: Democrats or Republicans? And could Russian-U.S. interaction in this area change, if Democrats win the upcoming U.S. election?

 Each problem emerging in Russian-American relations is determined by a specific historical context and does not necessarily depend on the political environment, especially when serious security issues are involved. We are solving them to the extent that the U.S. partners are prepared to tackle them together with us.

 However, statistics suggest that our two countries signed more strategic documents when the Republicans were in office.

 It is a well-known fact that our countries have significant disagreements over U.S. missile defense plans in Eastern Europe, strategically close to Moscow.

 Regrettably, no serious success can be reported in dealing with this problem. It is common knowledge that Russian President Vladimir Putin proposed a harmonious and logical system of measures, on which a solution could be based [at the Group of Eight summit] in Heiligendamm. These measures are based on a real assessment of the situation, on the readiness to search for ways of interaction, which would allow to ensure predictability in this area and would not damage the security interests of cooperating partners. And we are of course concerned about Russia’s security. This is the logic of our proposal, which is based in particular on using Russia’s technical means to monitor the situation in the missile proliferation area.

 We see no reason why Iran is a threat to the United States. Moreover, it does not have the technical capacity for this. In general, arguments that are used to justify the creation of such a system arouse serious doubts.

 How can you explain the fact that U.S. oral proposals voiced at the ministerial 2 + 2 meeting in Moscow differed so much from the written proposal?

 Probably, it would be right if our U.S. partners explain the reason behind the revision of their approaches. A fact, however, remains a fact: when U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates were in Moscow, they spoke about the possibility of a number of measures on the part of the U.S., which were conceived as a guarantee that the U.S. missile defense is not directed against Russia.

 Now I do not speak about whether these were serious and sufficient steps or not. Another thing was positive: we heard the signals and even saw the readiness to work on the creation of conditions, under which the third positioning district would not be directed against Russia, at the ministerial level.

 Talks are an exact process. They require certain formulas and clarity: just as mathematics or physics. Subsequently, we asked to formalize these ‘intentions’ in a form of a simple and clear proposal that the U.S. was ready to put forward. We waited for almost a month and a half. It is likely that this was the time required for the U.S. administration to adjust the wording and possibly to hold additional talks with partners. But what we finally saw lacked the elements that would have shown the U.S.’s real readiness to not only hear, but also to listen to us.

 It is likely that the Moscow proposals outran what the U.S. administration is really ready for.

 One of the elements of the U.S. oral proposal was the permanent presence of Russian officers at missile defense facilities in the Czech Republic and Poland. You have recently visited Warsaw, where consultations of the missile defense issue took place. In your opinion, could the Polish side agree to this?

 I cannot say that our Polish colleagues are making such a proposal to us. But this is not the issue; it does not concern one or two certain measures. Speaking about real guarantees that the missile defense system is not directed against Russia, the best one will be the absence of the third positing district in Europe. This is because today the need to survey the Russian deterrent systems is the only reason that would explain the deployment of this system.

 But if Russia secures the permanent presence of its experts in the Czech Republic and Poland, will its tough attitude to the U.S. plans to deploy elements of missile defense in Europe change?

 The problem is far more serious than just the presence of our officers at the missile defense facilities. Besides, the presence of experts does not guarantee anything by default. The missile defense system could be both rapidly activated and directed.

 Now you make the emphasis on one element of the U.S. proposal, which we viewed as an indication of the U.S. administration's intentions to work seriously with us, rather than a solution to the problem. I would like to stress once again that the best guarantee that the third positing district is not directed against Russia is that it is not deployed.

 Are Russia’s proposals on the joint use of the Gabala and Armavir radars, as well as the creation of joint centers for the exchange of information on missile launches, still relevant?

 This proposal is still on the negotiating table. This is a serious proposal, which is a constructive and what’s more an efficient alternative to the third positing district.

 I cannot say that U.S. colleagues are working seriously on it. The United States wants to use the potential of the Gabala radar, and possibly a radar in Armavir, to reinforce its system, rather than as an alternative to its third positing district. But a common solution cannot be secured by 'picking raisins from bread' on one's own. And once again, initially, the idea of using the Gabala radar was aimed at guaranteeing together that the situation is predictable and, if needed, securing all technical guarantees against missile non-proliferation, given that Russian interests are not damaged. The proposal was voiced in order to extend a hand of cooperation to, rather than to spite the U.S. side.

 Some political experts fear that that Azerbaijan and the U.S. may agree on the use of the Gabala radar at the bilateral level, which damages Russia’s interests. Are these fears justified?

 I do not think that these fears are justified. The Gabala radar is operated by the Russian Armed Forces under an agreement with Azerbaijan. It is operated and maintained by Russia. This is a serious and sophisticated complex, rather than for example a car, which can be transferred from one person to another. That is why, I think these fears are unjustified.

 As to the political facet of the issue, everything that we articulated and promoted as cooperation initiatives in our dialogue with the U.S. was fully adjusted with our Azeri friends. We maintain contact with our colleagues in Baku. We are thankful for the support they offered to our proposal.

 Russia and the U.S. agreed to hold consultations after the START expires in 2009. How will the talks progress?

 The consultations have been underway, but they are not as successful as we hoped for after a meeting of the Russian and U.S. presidents in Kennebunkport [in early July 2007], when a joint statement by Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice was published.

 In simpler terms, the parties agreed in Kennebunkport to save all the positive and consonant with Russia and the United States' security interests, to be found in the START, expiring next year, and formulate a set of elements for a new agreement, that would carry reliability, stability and predictability further into to the strategic sphere.

 We think that a range of START provisions that envision weapons elimination, verification and other measures have been fulfilled. That is why there exists no special necessity to extend them for the future. But there are quite a few elements in the agreement that ensure the sides' considerable restraint in the strategic offensive weapons sphere and would be rather valuable in the future. They would be valuable, above all, in ensuring stability and predictability. We plan to deal with our U.S. colleagues, taking these particular factors into account.

 As of today, the situation is disappointing. Our colleagues have a different idea of the tasks set. Our U.S. partners are talking about trust measures in relation to the Moscow [Strategic Offensive Reductions] Treaty.

 But, first, the Moscow Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions does not require prolongation. It will be effective until 2012. Second, the nucleus of our approach is that the stabilizing elements of restraint regarding the delivery means - which make the situation more or less predictable - should be at least saved, and, if possible, strengthened.

 What is your vision of Washington’s fulfillment of the SORT? Once Russia criticized the U.S. for not scrapping nuclear warheads, but rather just removing and stockpiling them…

 The implementation of the SORT has been running its course. We are now more concerned about the future - namely, how our relations with the U.S. in the strategic sphere will develop after 2009. Warheads do not exist just by themselves. They are 'delivered' by strategic delivery means. The issue deals with how plans for the development of offensive strategic arms will evolve given the absence of any limitations on delivery means. Is there a risk of destabilizing stockpiles?

 The SORT is one of the most successful agreements in the strategic arms control area. Furthermore, this is the only treaty that brought about the real reduction of strategic arms. And of course, it would be an inexcusable mistake if we loose such an important stability element in our relations.

 Russian President Vladimir Putin came up with the idea to establish an international uranium enrichment center, and U.S. President George W. Bush backed it. How it is being realized?

 There are areas where we have secured good cooperation with the U.S. side. Above all, I would call the initiative of Russian and U.S. presidents on the fight against nuclear terrorism as our joint success. In particular, the initiative is based on the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism adopted at Russia’s initiative. Russia and the U.S. together formalized approaches to organizing multilateral interaction on the suppression of access of terrorists to nuclear materials, not to speak about nuclear arms.

 The initiative was voiced at the G8 in St. Petersburg and was instantaneously backed by all participants in the meeting. Three conferences of supporters of the initiative have taken place since then. It is pleasing that the number of participants has been growing from one conference to another. The initiative was thought to be a global one, and it has been growing into such. Today over 70 states participate in the initiative. It is based on partnership, expertise exchange, and the interaction of certain agencies, given of course that participants are fully responsible for all actions on their territories.

 This is a rather fresh approach. And it has worked well, because there is a uniting element – the readiness of states to cooperate in the fight against the common threat. Participants in the initiative came from various regions, both economically developed and developing.

 I hope that the initiative has future. This is one of the instances that confirms that if Russia and the U.S. share a common goal and show unity in their approaches, they can achieve a lot together.

 There exists another initiative in the nuclear energy cooperation area. It stipulates the creation of a bunch of ‘positive’ incentives for a state that develops a nuclear program to do this the way the nuclear non-proliferation regime is securely guaranteed.

 One of the core ideas of the initiative proposed by Putin is the creation of a multinational uranium enrichment center. Russia possesses superb technologies and a powerful industrial potential in the uranium enrichment area. Better than the ones of many other states.

We set up a facility in Angarsk for this multinational center. We are ready to invite countries, which are interested in the joint use of the center’s enrichment potential for secure fuel deliveries, to the center. From both technical and economic viewpoints, the center is a perfect, and I would stress, a positive alternative to national programs that could be risky from the security point of view. Uranium enrichment is one of the most sensitive technologies as to nuclear proliferation.

 The center will be situated on the territory of a nuclear state, but will be under the constant surveillance of the [International Atomic Energy Agency] IAEA. This is another positive feature of this project, because there is every guarantee that the center is safe, and that it will never be used in pursuit of non-declared goals.

 Russia proposed Iran to use the uranium enrichment center. Tehran’s reaction was negative?

 Yes, we proposed to our Iranian partners many times to use this center. The proposal is still on the negotiating table.

 The use of this center by Iran would facilitate a reliable, quiet and predictable fulfillment of all tasks connected with the maintenance of the Iranian nuclear energy sector. But Iran prefers to develop its own enrichment capabilities, and it was doing that covertly for many years. This is one of the reasons why the character of its nuclear program arouses concern. Iran’s only nuclear power plant is being built in Bushehr. Russia produces fuel for this plant. The first batches [of fuel] that will be loaded in the reactor have already been supplied. This provides a guarantee to Iran that nearly all of its needs in fuel in the foreseeable future will be met by Russia. And this is the best option both from the economic and technical points of view. No need for any other fuel will occur in Iran in the coming decade, since no other nuclear power plants are to appear soon in that country.

In such a setting, Iran could quietly start a serious negotiating process with the ‘six’, broaden cooperation with the IAEA guided by the resolution of the organization's Board of Governors and clear all queries which still persist over its nuclear program.
 This requires time, as well as calm and stable cooperation with the IAEA on the basis of a decision of the Board of Governors.

 Following the meeting of the sextet of intentional mediators on Iran that took place in Berlin: various assessments of the adjusted UN Security Council resolution were articulated: Russia said that the UN Security Council's new resolution would not contain tight sanctions against Iran, while the United States said it would be punitive in nature. How can you explain this?

 The difference in the assessment was obviously dictated by the compromise character of the document. I would not say that it is not a usual diplomatic practice to underscore in a document what one would wish to see. The objective reality is that the new resolution is, above all, a serious political signal to our Iranian colleagues on the necessity to cooperate with the UN Security Council and to follow the resolutions of the IAEA Board of Governors. I would like to note that the UN Security Council did not get engaged with this problem on its own. Its authority and resolutions backed the demands to Iran in order to restore confidence in the peaceful nature of its program.

 The resolution has yet to be prepared, with only its basic elements having been adjusted. Though the author of the resolution is the European ‘troika’ [France, Germany, and United Kingdom], it was a subject of lengthy debates within the framework of the ‘six.’

 When this document is made public, you will see that it contains serious signals for Iran and envisions a certain expansion of the earlier sanctions by the UN Security Council.
 Importantly, a new resolution is drafted in exactly the same way as the previous ones - in the context of Article 41 of Chapter 7 of the UN Charter, which rules out any use of force. So, no 'punitive' content is involved here.

 And where does the ‘red line,’ behind which Russia will speak for tougher sanctions, lie? And is Iran is open enough in cooperation with IAEA in this regard?

 The sanctions are somewhat tightened each time the Security Council passes a resolution. But the tightening is balanced and commensurable with the situation.

 As to cooperation between Iran and the IAEA, Teheran has at least been moving in the right direction where the clarification of the remaining questions about its past activities is involved. This is important from the point of view of restoring confidence in the peaceful nature of Iran’s program. Strictly speaking, our Iranian colleagues could have long started this work without losing so many years on confrontation - at first with the IAEA's Board of Governors, and, subsequently, with the UN Security Council. However, an important first step as to the fulfillment of the demands articulated by the IAEA has been made. We praise this. We also count on the fact that the UN Security Council will praise the process as well. Iran should fully cooperate with the IAEA's Board of Governors, and, among other things, get back to the implementation of the so-called additional protocol on control, freeze uranium enrichment and take some other measures pending the work to untangle all difficult problems. I think that all this is quite feasible, if relevant political decisions are made. Concerns of the international community could be removed, and thus far more favorable conditions for Iran’s multifaceted cooperation with other countries could be created. The last thing has already served well for Iran’s economic and technological interests.

 Russia suspended the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty on December 12, 2007. The U.S. announced it left the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty on the same day six years ago. Certain comparisons come to mind. Is this a mere coincidence or a hint?

 There are no hints about this. And I state this with due responsibility. We acted in line with notification schemes stipulated by the agreement. This is a coincidence that the dates are similar. The essence of the approach is totally different: we did not withdraw from the treaty, we just suspended it.

 We froze the treaty, because an uncommon and hardly acceptable situation had taken shape in the sphere of conventional armed forces limitations. We had lived so far under a treaty that regulated relations between the Warsaw Pact and NATO. There is no Warsaw Pact any more, and the NATO configuration has changed: it not only sucks in new countries, but also ‘privatizes’ their arms quotas: this means quotas that the Warsaw Pact members had under the Treaty.

 There is the [1999] agreement adapting the treaty to new conditions, which Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine, have already ratified, while NATO has not. Two elements are required to enact the adapted treaty: an adaptation agreement and the outdated treaty. We froze the old agreement, but we have not withdrawn from it. We have saved the necessary legislative base for acting jointly in a new agreement, the moment our partners honor their obligation to ratify the agreement on adaptation. And we all could act under a new treaty. To put it simple, we said on December 12: we are freezing the old treaty and wait for you to sign the new one.

 Some Western experts say that Russia’s position changes swiftly: at first, Russia insists that NATO members just ratify the CFE Treaty, then it demands that the adapted treaty is modernized, and then proposes to introduce provisions about the navy to the treaty. Your comment, please.

 I would recommend the experts to read what we say attentively. We have never rushed from one side to another. We raised the issue of upgrading the treaty eight to nine years ago, and we insisted on developing an adapted version. Finally, an adapted version emerged and we were sure it would start working in a couple of years.

 In a normal setting, if our colleagues in NATO had not imposed a moratorium on ratification of the agreement to adapt the CFE Treaty, it would have been in existence by now for five or six years, and we would have been using it quietly to tackle all related problems, primarily the issue of flank limitations. By the way, no one now speaks about the navy.

 The treaty provides for flank limitations that are discriminative primarily to Russia. They exist in other signatories of the treaty, but they are more of a limit for the deployment of conventional arms. In Russia, flank limitations exist as a ‘sub-level.’ Or in simpler terms, Russian Armed Forces command cannot move troops within its own territory, although this is required to solve current security problems.

 NATO introduced a moratorium on the enforcement of the adapted CFE Treaty, and thus on a possibility to begin discussing this issue. That is why we tell our partners now: fulfill your Istanbul obligations, with the swiftest possible ratification of the adapted CFE Treaty being the main one. But let’s decide on what has been discriminative to Russia all these years: it is high time that ‘flanks’ on our territory were cancelled.

 I would like to underscore that Russia’s moratorium on the CFE Treaty does not mean that we will hurry to build up arms in this or that Russian region tomorrow. The issue concerns the fact that we should have the right to dispose of our arms on our territory as we consider it necessary, just as any other signatories of the treaty.

 In you opinion, will the CFE Treaty problem be solved this year or do you view the future of the treaty in a pessimistic way?

 I am a pragmatic and realistic-minded person, and do not quite like emotions, especially 'pessimism.' Emotions are a poor guide in diplomatic work. We are not just prepared, we are charged to seek solutions. But solutions must be serious and provide answers to the questions we have raised.

 And the last question. It was reported that U.S. Ambassador to Russia William Burns will soon leave this position and will be appointed as undersecretary of state for political affairs. How do you like the work with the ambassador?

 William Burns is a man who has been working with us in various capacities for years. Naturally, he protects interests of his state just as any other diplomat. But he is a good professional, an honest partner and a serious person to speak to. We expect to continue to do useful work with him when he takes up his new job as well.

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