Interfax's Interview

Mr. Simmons can you say that the Caucasus and Central Asia constitute a zone of strategic interests for NATO?

 Strategy implies that we have lines of differences or lines of defense, and as you know we don’t believe that in fact that there are single countries that are enemies.  There are common challenges and common threats we face - things like terrorism, and like narcotics that we were discussing this morning, and in that context regions are strategic not because of their geography but because of location.

 For instance, Central Asia is strategic because it’s a big way for narcotics to get to Russia and then on to Europe. So in that sense it’s strategic. The Caucases is strategic because it’s a major energy path - Ajerbaijan is a major producer - so they are not strategic in the old sense of geography because they face enemies, but they are strategic because they deal with the current problems that we’re dealing with.

Do you agree with the opinion that there is rivalry between Russia and the West in former Soviet republics?

 From a NATO point of view we always say there’s not, we never tell these countries that they have to make a choice between their partnership in NATO and their membership in CIS or CSTO, so we always try and emphasize that these are complimentary processes, and are not competitive, and so when I visit the Caucasus and Central Asia, we always make the point that we are not asking them to make choices, and not asking them for competition - we want cooperation, we think that working with NATO is in their interests, and we have no trouble with them working with other organizations or belonging to other organizations.

Nevertheless is NATO planning to deploy new military bases in the Caucasus and Central Asia?

 No, the basic commitment we made  about new members would apply to members in those regions as well. We have no intentions of deploying large numbers of conventional forces in these countries or in any new member-country, and we’ve fulfilled that commitment and live by that commitment, so that pledge wouldn’t change if (and of course it’s an “if” because we haven’t made any decisions) we were to admit, for instance, countries from the Caucasus - that pledge would remain that we would not base large numbers of conventional forces on the territory of a new ally.

You say that there has been no political decision but Georgian politicians are claiming that they can move from intensified dialogue to MAP as early as the upcoming NATO summit.

 There is no decision about that. Factually I can describe three stages of the membership process - intensified dialogue - which Georgia got in September of last year; a membership action plan, and then an invitation to join the alliance.

 The next stage would be for Georgia to move from “intensified dialogue” to “MAP,” but there’s been no decision about that, it’s a political decision, it’s for allies to make, and as the Sec General made very clear when he was in Georgia two-three weeks ago, that there has been no decision and obviously it depends on how well Georgia continues to do on reform. Obviously the Georgians themselves want it, but from a NATO point of view, there has been do decision…

What is our personal estimate about when Georgia my join NATO – in the next few years or will it take decades?

 There’s no definitive timeframe to any of these processes, the current MAP countries - Croatia, Macedonia and Albania have been in MAP for 10 years, but that doesn’t mean that the next country is going to be in MAP for 10 years. So there’s no definitive timeframe – five years, ten years, etc. Obviously there will be a decision one way or another, about MAP in Bucharest and then the process after that. To say how long Georgia will be in MAP remains an open question. So I cannot say when or if Georgia will join the alliance.  It’s not something that we know the timing about - it’s set by political decisions and the progress being made toward reform.

What does the air defense exchange program of NATO and Georgia actually imply? Does it mean that NATO radars will be stationed in Georgian territory?

 An air defense exchange does not mean that and we have no intention of deploying any radars on Georgian territory. What it means is the closest NATO country to Georgia - in this case Turkey - will give unclassified data about air traffic over their country. It’s not to defend them, it’s not linked to air defense, it merely gives them unclassified data about air traffic over their country.

 We have such an agreement with six or seven countries - some that are candidates for membership, some that are not - like Finland. So it merely gives unclassified data about air traffic over that country.

Is there any connection between this project and the so-called missile incident between Russia and Georgia?

 The decision to give this air traffic data was actually taken in 2003, but it’s a technical thing that has to be worked out in communication lines. It’s just coincidence that in fact technically that worked out after the incident. In fact the team to do the last technical connection visited Georgia in April - before the missile incident. And so we’re carrying forward a political decision that was taken in 2003, and as I say, technically the work was done in April, before the missile incident took place.

Can Georgia become a member of the alliance before frozen conflicts are settled? Doesn’t this contradict the regulations of the alliance itself?

 Let me say three things: first of all, NATO respects the territorially integrity of Georgia; second, as part of the IPAP Process which they have now, we have urged Georgia to solve these conflicts by peaceful means, and we’ve tried to discourage any talk of trying to solve these conflicts by military solutions.

 What the 1995 study says, is that you should develop good neighborly relations with your neighbors, and in fact that applied to a whole number of situations that existed at the time we wrote the study. But it doesn’t imply that all of those issues have to be solved, and, for instance, there were still border differences between the Baltic States and Russia, when the Baltic States were admitted and we still admitted them. So, in fact, what we urge is a peaceful solution to the conflict, and that countries develop good relations with their neighbors, whether in or outside the alliance, but it doesn’t mean that every territorial issue has to be solved.

What do you think of the cooperation with Russia on Afghanistan? For the first time in its history Russia has given permission for military transit to Afghanistan to NATO countries, France and Germany. Are you satisfied with the organization of the transit and are you interested in a similar arrangement for other NATO countries?

 As you say two countries have bilateral arrangements. If you look at the number of countries involved in Afghanistan, it would be useful perhaps to look at a multilateral arrangement, i.e. a NATO-Russia agreement on transfers, because getting supplies and manpower to Afghanistan is one of our big problems and obviously, if we can transit Russia both overflying it and also by land transportation would be useful.

 Obviously some of the biggest contributors are Canada, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom. For Turkey it is easier to go along other routes. There is a range of countries that have large forces, but now also almost all allies are making some kind of contribution. I think in fact that every country ships through Russia but the necessity and possibility of some cooperation with all countries would useful. But the biggest contributors would be the Netherlands, Canada and the United Kingdom.

Will NATO be in charge of the security of the energy infrastructure, in particular, is the alliance planning to offer protection to the Baku-Ceyhan oil pipeline, if such a need should arise?

 Well, as you know at the Riga summit, which we just concluded, one of the decisions was for NATO to look at ways to guarantee the security of the pipelines.

 I think the one area where NATO might add value in energy security is the question of protecting energy infrastructure first, of course, in allies and then in partners. This pipeline goes to allied Turkey as well as across Georgia and Azerbaijan. So obviously one of the things when we are looking at energy security would be protecting energy infrastructure and this would include this pipeline and other pipelines.

 I want to emphasize that this is not a new mission for NATO. NATO has long had plans to protect energy infrastructure in Europe, even during the cold war. This is not a new issue or a new role for NATO.

What do you think of the prospect of establishing a NATO energy organization in the future?

 We have in fact an energy organization. We have the NATO pipeline organization. We have a large number of pipelines in Europe which we built during the cold war to protect ourselves. We haven’t sold them, we still own them. So in fact NATO is already involved in energy. Whether it is going to take a new role, get involved in these pipelines, I don’t know. But as I said the role in energy is not new, we’ve had this pipeline organization dating back to the 1950s.

What is your opinion of the outcome of the recent summit of Caspian Sea states? Is NATO interested in expanding its presence in the Caspian?

 The summit involved all countries of the region. And I am pleased that they made some progress in delineating the boundaries as this has been an issue, for instance, between Azerbaijan and Iran and other things like that. I have to say it’s not clear to me whether in the long term Iran can be a continuing player in that process but I think that the other four countries - Turkmenistan, Russia, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan - are a reasonable combination. They discussed their common problems in the Caspian and we can only encourage that.

 Our own role is to work with each of the countries in connection with the forces they have in the Caspian. They want NATO systems but that is not directed against anyone. It’s just to help them with defense reform in all areas. And we are prepared to continue that, but I don’t think that NATO will have a big role. We work with individual countries and as I said before we have no trouble cooperating with them. 

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