Interfax's Interview

The interview took place shortly before a meeting of the Russian and U.S. presidents, at which Russian President Vladimir Putin laid out his proposals on missile defense.

Russian Foreign Affairs Minister Sergei Lavrov said Wednesday that the West is not only using Cold-War rhetoric, but that it is taking actions of that nature by deciding to deploy elements of the U.S. missile shield in Central Europe. What is your opinion on this?

The shield is not aimed against Russia. All military specialists know perfectly well that the rockets that would be placed in Poland are active in very high parts of the atmosphere, near the outer space. Those rockets are designed only to intercept long-range missiles that fly at such high altitudes. Besides, the rockets that would be installed in Poland are too small to carry nuclear warheads.

We would like to stress again - there are no technical possibilities to attack Russia with those rockets. On the other hand, the shield will be completely useless should an attack be launched on Europe from the Russian territory using mid-range missiles. The leaders of the Russian Federation have all this information. We want to live in peace with Russia and its authorities know it too.

What is your position on Russia's tests of new Iskander missiles and statements of Russian politicians and generals on an asymmetric response to the missile shield and to the repositioning of Russian missiles to target Europe?

There are no reasons for a reaction of this kind. As I already said, the shield is not directed against Russia. Also, please try to imagine what Poles feel when they hear Russian generals saying they would like to target the Polish territory with their rockets.

Minister Lavrov also said Wednesday that Poland treats the shield as an offensive weapon, since it wants more protection after the deployment and says the shield will give protection from Russia, which in consequence would demonstrate that Russia is right about its perception of the shield as a threat.

I must admit that it's very difficult to follow that kind of intellectual equilibristics. At the end of the day what matters are facts, and the facts are that the shield is a defensive facility and for technical reasons cannot be used to launch a missile attack on the Russian territory. How can one say that something is black, when it quite obviously is white? Minister Lavrov confuses causes with effects. It is \\Russia's warnings of missile repositioning to target Poland that create a sense of danger and convince us to look for ways to strengthen our military capacities.

Russia claims that Iran is not currently capable of threatening the West and that the shield will be an element of a wider arsenal of the USA that includes nuclear weapons, which will make the shield an offensive weapon.

We do not share this opinion.

What countries can pose an increased threat to Poland after the deployment of elements of the shield on its territory?

Those countries that have the capacities.

The so-called rogue states that the US is talking about?

Those that have the capacities. There is no reason for us to exchange such opinions in the public debate. In any case, I don't mean Russia.

But we're not asking you to disclose the details of negotiations, but to share your insight as to facts - what is currently a threat for Poland.

Some time ago we agreed with minister Lavrov not to bring up such arguments in the media.

Russian politician don't seem to honor that agreement.

Yes, but we do. We don't always have to keep up with Russian initiatives -  that's why we had a visit of Wladyslaw Stasiak [head of Poland's National Security Bureau] in Moscow. We share information that can give Russia reassurances using normal channels. There are no reasons for very emotions rhetoric in the media.

Does Russia have the theoretical capacity to be a military threat to Poland?

Theoretical... I think that we could divulge on various possibilities in the global security situation, but it wouldn't serve any purpose.

Are you analyzing the influence of the deployment of the shield's elements on Polish-Iranian relations?

We analyze all political aspects. Poland maintains a reasonable level of diplomatic relations with Iran and other countries in the Middle East. We're very active in the Persian Gulf region. It's a conscious policy on our part. We don't think that the action we're taking now could undermine those relations.

Is it technically possible for the missile shield base to be exterritorial? The Americans said earlier the time necessary to make a decision on an interceptor launch is too short for any Polish general or politician to be able to take part in the decision-making process.

There are various forms of agreements under which such installations are deployed. Negotiations are underway. I don't think it would be reasonable to speculate before we evaluate all the scenarios of solutions that can be adopted.

From the point of view of Polish domestic and international law, is it possible for the U.S. bases to be exterritorial?

We're analyzing the possibilities and various scenarios, but I will not speculate on the legal and technical aspects of this matter.

When can the information on the base's status be expected?

We quite naturally want to get the best possible conditions -  ones that we believe will be acceptable politically by the Polish public opinion. The ratification process foreseen by the Polish law enables elected officials to have adequate insight. There is a ratification process still ahead of us and it will be decisive.

I think that the moment a certain variation of the package - both in terms of cooperation in the defense field, as well as the base and its status - is chosen, we will present our conclusions and there will be a resolution of the Council of Ministers and the ratification process will begin.

That moment will be preceded by a wide political debate. At this point it is quite limited in the sense that we have political consultations, but only of those things that can be communicated to the public.

Does this mean you also consult with the parliamentary opposition on the matter?

We've had such consultations.

Is the expected date of completion of negotiations with the US in the fall, which was mentioned by your deputy Witold Waszczykowski, still possible?

We haven't given ourselves any deadlines. The deputy minister shared his opinions on the process so far. I think that this date could be possible, but much will depend on the political discussion, the discussion between presidents [Kaczynski and Bush] that will take place Friday in Jurata [Poland].

Does Poland have any influence on what the US proposes to Russia in this project?

Negotiations are a process that leads to the conclusion of an agreement. I know nothing of any agreement that would be signed between the United States and Russia. Poland is holding talks with the US, because it is our intention to conclude or reject a package of international agreements. As far as I know. USA is also holding consultation talks with the Russian Federation. We've also held them.

Has the US offered Russia participation in the project?

I have no such information from the authorities of the Russian Federation.

President Bush mentioned in Prague that he was inviting Russian generals and scientists to the US, and Defense Secretary Robert Gates also voiced similar proposals during his recent visit in Russia.

I understand, but I cannot comment on media reports.

What range of issues will be regulated by the new package of international agreements between the US and Poland? Deputy minister Waszczykowski spoke of a wide defense and political agreement.

Yes, we are hoping for that. It's difficult to say at this point what the package will be. An initial phase of the exchange of opinions and positions regarding the entire technical aspect of the shield has been completed. At this point we need for political decisions. We hope for a wider understanding.

So from the technical point of view all aspects of the shield deployment have been determined?

From the technical point of view, all elements of the matter are known to the parties in great detail. We can now reconcile differences, which will undoubtedly take much time.

How would you describe the differences over technical matters? Will they be easy to overcome? What is the potential for an understanding?

The potential for an understanding is significant.

How much progress has been made since the point of departure? What is the difference between the departure and now?

It's a matter of political issues and we've come significantly closer. We see a possibility for a wider agreement.

Some reports suggest Poland will be forced to participate in the costs of shield deployment on its territory. Has the government of the Foreign Ministry assumed there will be any spending on the deployment in the next year's budget?

The ministry is planning some actions of revolutionary nature. We will greatly increase outlays on development aid and the construction of new outposts. There will be a diplomatic offensive in various regions of the world, and other matters will be dealt with only when they become real.

Is it possible that the shield deployment will be an item of the Foreign Ministry's budget for next year?

We are working on the budget and I haven't noticed such items at this point. We are, however, at the phase of negotiations and from the very start we've been saying that we do not presume any outcome at the start of the process. This is why there are no reasons to do any budget work for this project.

What did Poland want to achieve and demonstrate to Russia by moving the meat embargo issue to the European Union level? Did we really not have the possibility of handling this case on our own?

The embargo issue has been going on for a long time now - since November 2005. Since that time, we have raised the issue many times. [Before we went the EU route] we had not made any progress on the level of bilateral contacts. The issue is handled by the Union with regard to an entire range of regulations. EU foreign ministers have agreed that the Union would take over the competence and initiative in this respect, which is why the issue is now at the interest of EU institutions.

We didn't want to demonstrate anything. We wanted effective action, and our decision was a result of the failure of bilateral initiatives. It wasn't before sanitary inspections organized by independent EU institutions that we have evidence that Polish food, which Russia has objected to, is healthy. There is also a political context here - all states of the European Union should be treated equally because of their similar status and rights.

What is your opinion on the EU's conduct in this case? The Polish press has recently carried opinions of constitutionalists, who pointed out that issues related to international trade are the sole competence of Brussels, which is why the EU should have taken action in Poland's name immediately after the introduction of the embargo instead of being forced to take action through Poland's veto of the EU-Russia PCA negotiations and arm twisting.

Believe me that we haven't twisted any arms. It would be completely unnecessary, as the European Commission very much supported the Polish position. President Barroso is personally very much engaged in the protection of rights of member states, especially new ones. I don't see this process in such a negative way.

The European Union has shown adequate solidarity here. Naturally because of different interests, various member states showed various levels of commitment and support, but for sure institutions were on our side.

What was the mission of the Wednesday delegation to Moscow, led by the head of the National Security Bureau Wladyslaw Stasiak? The head of the Russian Federation Council Igor Ivanov said Wednesday at a joint press conference with the Polish delegation that Russia is interested in having good and neighborly relations with Poland. Was the goal of that delegation only political or are more concrete results to be expected?

It was a visit that was supposed to serve a certain kind of warming of political relations and I believe it took place. I expect a similar reaction on the part of Poland. I don't know, however, if there will be any reaction on the Russian side.

Poland gave a friendly gesture, which gave Russia room for an acceptable solution. We expected positive declarations from Russia before the Samara summit. But it didn't happen. There are always possibilities, but I don't think we would like to use this situation for political reasons. With good political will, this matter would have been closed a long time ago.

Will Poland again try to demonstrate that it cares about good relations with Russia? Does Poland have a strategy in relations with Russia?

Yes, [the strategy is] patience. But I'm afraid one cannot make positive gestures indefinitely without adequate responses. We're waiting not just for gestures, but concrete solutions.

A recent poll by the Levada Center showed that a fifth of Russians believe Poland is an enemy state. How does Poland receive the results of that poll? Will it take any steps on the social level?

It's a problem primarily for Russia. We are consciously speaking in a way that does not antagonize the society in Poland when it comes to Polish-Russian relations. We're talking quote openly about the embargo, but it's not the language of aggression.

None of my statements includes threats or very tough opinions, or even personal remarks on anyone. On the part of Russian politicians we do see such statements that influence the Russian society. In conflicts of this kind, it's always good to keep negative dialog at a low level.

Similar research conducted in Poland would probably show that Polish society also does not see Russians as a friendly nation.

I don't share that view. On the level of social contacts, on the Polish side there are very friendly feelings toward the Russian society. Russians as a nation are not treated as an enemy.

Psychology seems to weight heavily on Polish-Russian relations. We see not only exchanges of views and facts, but also leaks on rejected invitations and flowers, and they seem strange...

Grotesque. But there has not been any flower issue.

In this situation, should Poland not adopt a more subtle policy and enter into the game played by the other party?

I'm really a very busy person that deals with many serious matters. I admit that sometimes I'm taken by surprise with something like that, but I have an impression we've reached a development phase in which it would be good to have a serious discussion. If we want good relations, we need to treat each other seriously. I see such grotesque developments, but I'm unable no comment.

On Wednesday Rossiyskaya Gazeta again said you will soon leave the Polish cabinet. Are those rumors substantiated? What is the reason behind them? When will your mission at the ministry end in the sense that your goals will be achieved?

We're at such a dynamic phase in Poland's foreign policy and there's so much to achieve. Those goals are still distant and they do not necessarily have to be my goals. Every minister knows from the moment of the nomination you are a minister only for a certain period of time. From my point of view it's not important. I'm not going to give opinion on when my mission will end.

I'm a person that has for a long time been doing various beneficial things wherever I work. This is how I see my mission, and the position is less important.

So you deny the rumors of your planned swift departure from the ministry?

Maybe the Polish media do not see one thing - that the matter of the dismissal of the foreign minister is not to be discussed at all. No debate ever takes place on it. Usually in the case of foreign ministers it's best to issue a statement in the moment of the dismissal.

What is the reason behind this recurring rumor?

I'm high up the government ladder and I'm involved in a large-scale reorientation of the Polish foreign policy and the way the diplomacy functions. It is quite naturally met with resistance, including in the media circles. But whether the rumors prove true or not - every minister leaves at some point.

Poland is active in the field of further European Union enlargement. You have recently talked with the foreign minister of Portugal and declared a similar position on the matter, but Portugal seems to support more the aspirations of Balkan countries, while Poland has expressed many times its support for Ukraine's membership of the EU.

Our position on enlargement is very open. I always begin with naming Balkan countries, and Ukraine is named as the last country, even though it is our top priority.

Who can Poland count on in this respect within the European Union?

Support for our position is growing. Since I've been in office, one thing became obvious - we're trying to reduce the media fear of Poland's isolation within the EU because of its individual position on things. There are various techniques of reaching the desired goal within the EU. One of them is to formulate a problem and patiently repeat the arguments. I've adopted this technique and it's quite effective.

What do you fear most in the new constitutional treaty and the institutional reform of the EU - Germany's supremacy and their increased weight within the current institutional structures, or the transformation of the EU from a supranational organization into a quasi-federation?

The problem should be put differently. There is no doubt the Union needs institutional reform, if only because of enlargement. It's necessary, although I don't directly link enlargement with the institutional reform. In my opinion, one could relatively easily lead to the accession of Croatia - it would require only minor treaty changes. But we do need to put in order the treaty bases and the sources of law of the EU.

A quasi-federation is a significant threat, since there is no uniform European public opinion. The public opinion of Finland differs greatly from that of Portugal. Even though we can have very good discussions with the foreign minister of Portugal, our priorities on the issue of the European neighborhood policy are different and time is needed before we reach a consensus, since we view things differently.

But ministers meet and exchange views very often, which cannot be said of residents of the outskirts of Porto and Bialystok, who never met. That's why we believe that creating a federation on this stage of the social development within the European Union would be premature.

Poland is of course satisfied with its current status under the Treaty of Nice and we would like to preserve as much as possible from that treaty. It's hard to predict what will happen during the EU's June summit, but one thing is sure - the current draft of the constitutional treaty will not be adopted.

What are Poland's main proposals for the EU's institutional reform?

The official position has not been presented yet. I can confirm the elements of the position regarding the change of the voting system in the EU council. We propose to modify the definition of the double majority that will give more influence to citizens - the so-called algebraic root system. It is a rather rigid position.

We also raise the issue of the division of competence, especially when we deal with mixed competences split between the EU and member states. We believe the current draft of the constitutional treaty treats those matters too ambiguously.

We would like to keep as much unanimity as possible, but we also point to the need for stronger cooperation in several fields - like cooperation on the fight with terrorism or cooperation of the police. It would be difficult to image a situation that after we join the Schengen zone there will be no borders and criminals will be able to move freely between countries, while the police of various countries, in order to do the same, would need to use complicated procedures to keep each other informed. It would be illogical and unreasonable.

What is Poland's position towards the concept of a mini-treaty proposed by French President Nicolas Sarkozy?

That concept is undoubtedly much more interesting than the current draft of the treaty. But President Sarkozy's vision to a large extent means the adoption of the entire institutional package, and we have some very concrete proposals in this respect. We differ in this field. This concept is interesting, but insufficient.

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