Interfax's Interview

How would you assess the pace at which Ukrainian-Russian relations have been developing over the past two years? What was your vision of these relations two years ago?

I had a slightly different vision of them. I primarily saw them as relations that are mainly governed by pragmatism. I think that this argument would suit both countries if we had managed to do a better job in implementing individual projects or securing consolidated positions on various international issues. My opinion is that it would have only given these relations a different meaning. But not everything has happened according to our plans.

I believe that there are several reasons for it. One of them is that our Russian colleagues are having difficulty breaking free from the circumstances and parameters of our relationship that has formed over the past 10-15 years. I do not say that everything was bad in those relations. But I think that both countries, Russia and Ukraine, would have liked to see clarity, would have liked these relations to be far-sighted and offer the feeling of sincerity, friendship and understanding, as well as the feeling that the countries stand shoulder to shoulder and have clear positions on a variety of issues, no matter what kind of challenges – international or national – they pose.

Are you satisfied with the present level of Ukrainian-Russian relations in the export and transit of energy resources?

My answer is both yes and no. Why no? Well, I am primarily governed by my understanding of the fact that Russia will continue acting as a supplier of energy sources for a key and leading consumption market such as the market of the European Union for several decades to come. It is one of the realities.

The second reality is that Ukraine is a unique, I would say in some way, eternal transit route for these energy resources from the standpoint of economic market principles that are free from politics.

What steps do the countries need to take? They need to form a sound tandem that would demonstrate all of the strong points of this supplier-country and this transit country.

Of course, I am not going to comment on the participation of third and fourth parties in this tandem, although they certainly exist. But we are now speaking about a bilateral format.

To my regret, the countries have not managed to understand the integral nature of this policy over the past two years and the previous period of time. For this reason, Europe’s perception of relations between Ukraine and Russia and the two countries abilities to provide for all of the European market’s energy needs in a stable and regular manner has not improved.

And when we speak about our main document, which is to be signed soon, I will insist that Ukraine should come up with an initiative to fill this document with strategic prospects.

Generally speaking, it is a great mistake that countries in Central Asia have not integrated into the policy in the area of energy resource exports. They could pursue this policy together with Russia and Ukraine.

I mean Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, which are players of the energy market, in this case the gas market. They realize that cooperation with the EU via Russia and Ukraine has no prospects.

It will be a shame if a considerable part of their resources will go somewhere in the East, rather than to Europe, to be more precise to Ukraine and Russia. It will not be a tragedy for the global market. But it will be a drama for our possibilities. I am speaking about the possibilities of Russia and Ukraine.

If one gives more detailed consideration to our bilateral ties, of course, it would be desirable to have a clear set of agreements outlining the principles for forming deliveries of Russian gas to Ukraine. What I mean is when we speak about volumes, we would like them to be accurate and clearly determined, but not only for a year because it is hard to handle this systematic planning month by month.

A price setting formula requires clarity as well. Regrettably, it is difficult for us to say that prices for gas are set based on generally understandable principles. It triggers suspicions regarding various political aspects.

[Russian President] Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin and I have discussed it on numerous occasions. We want to build these relations based exclusively on market economy principles.

Ukraine does not need cheap gas. Ukraine does not need privileges. We understand that nothing happens in the world free of charge. I can say that Ukraine will also pay its bill. It is a reliable transit route. But, as far as the idea of setting prices based on economic principles is concerned, I think that these relations definitely require major improvements.

How do you think Ukrainian-Russian relations can change if Ukraine joins NATO?

 I do not think they will change from a strategic standpoint. Their nuances may change. But the nuances depend on mutual understanding. I am guided by the fact that forming its own security policy is a matter for my country and my people. There are several laws that have been adopted and clearly state this responsibility. My opinion is that relations between any two countries should primarily be governed by their respect toward these definitions.

Secondly, when building a model of Ukraine’s participation in the collective European security system and the Euro-Atlantic defense policy, our categorical position is that it must not be aimed against anyone else. We, as politicians, are totally convinced that this is the most optimal answer in the context of our European and regional choice of security principles.

This is the most effective security system, which contains a major political component and entails minimal costs. Obviously, what we are simply witnessing today is that any basic, fundamental defense and security policy took on a collective character long time ago. It comes as a response from the common European home. Ukraine is located in the center of Europe.

Thirdly, Russia is a great country and our eternal neighbor. It would be a major mistake to ignore our relations in this issue. The question we are facing today is what Ukraine should do to treat Russia’s interests in the matter appropriately. This issue will be discussed at talks we need to hold with Russia in the future.

I am convinced that Russia has a number of questions as well. They include questions of how Ukrainian territory can potentially be used, how Ukraine treats plans to deploy third countries’ nuclear arsenals, and what Ukraine thinks about the deployment of military bases… Ukraine has answers to all these questions. These answers will help optimize our relations with Russia. They will not complicate them.

The fourth point is ongoing interaction within the Russia-NATO and Ukraine-NATO formats. It indicates that our two countries are seeking harmony between their policy and that of the North-Atlantic Treaty Organization’s defense bloc. This is the road which, I think, will allow both countries to pursue parallel integration processes and to considerably bridge the gap between the standards of each other’s understanding of their relations, each other’s understanding that Russia and Ukraine have a cooperation plan with NATO.

There is one more aspect. During a meeting with the defense minister of Russia, I said that Ukraine is ready to assume any obligations and guarantees that would give Russia the feeling of total safety and stability during joint projects with Ukraine to develop and produce military technologies and armaments. I think that, as far as this issue is concerned, we can have sound prospects.

When do you think it would be advisable to launch talks on the further presence of the Russian Black Sea Fleet in Ukraine?

 I think that one needs to be governed by two realities. One reality is that the entire system of our legal relations in this issue will be formulated and signed and will be valid until 2017. The actual state of affairs is another thing. When we suggested setting up a sub-committee that would consider the issue of the Russian Black Sea Fleet’s temporary deployment in Sevastopol and the implementation of appropriate documents on this issue, we sought to bring agreements on land, the delimitation of the military zone itself and the military base in line with all of the previously signed documents.

We have a question about the management of assets, primarily real estate. The Ukrainian authorities do not understand why new houses, including non-military facilities, have been built in territories that are regulated by special-purpose laws. I think some primitive private interests may be involved there. They discredit the high status of the parties.

The third issue deals with the use of radio frequencies, while the fourth problem is the use of the navigation arsenal along the entire perimeter of the Crimean peninsula. We are a country that has assumed international commitments to ensure the safety of navigation for ships, including foreign vessels, within our territorial waters. But we need “ears and eyes” to fulfill these obligations. I am speaking about technical means that will help fulfill these functions.

In fact, I see no more problems with maintaining our status quo until 2017. On the other hand, there is another fundamental document – the Constitution of Ukraine. It does not allow any foreign countries to deploy bases on the territory of Ukraine.

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