Interfax's Interview

From which regions do the worst threats to NATO come? Do you think the Alliance could play a more active role in settling the crisis surrounding Iran and North Korea?

In today's globalised world, security challenges have also globalised.  Threats such as terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction may originate and grow far away from our borders, before suddenly hitting us at our homes.  We must be prepared to respond to such threats wherever and whenever they emerge, and in NATO, we are.  The Alliance is conducting challenging missions and operations on three different continents, and we are engaged in a comprehensive process of military transformation to prepare for future contingencies.  But we know, as well, that today's security challenges require a new level of cooperation well beyond NATO's member states, and we are keen to promote that kind of cooperation, including with our strategic partner Russia.

NATO member states are obviously concerned by recent developments with respect to Iran and North Korea, and we are following those developments closely.  The North Atlantic Council issued a strong statement condemning the North Korean nuclear weapons test earlier this month. As in the case of North Korea's missile tests several months ago, we also have been in close contact with Russian representatives to discuss this shared challenge.  However, the international community's diplomatic efforts on these two issues are channelled through other fora, in particular the United Nations Security Council, and I don't think NATO could or should play a more active role for the time being.

Your visit is proceeding against the backdrop of new "irritants" in Russia-NATO relations, given Georgia's stepped up efforts to join the Alliance.  The Russian Foreign Ministry has warned that Georgia's accession to an unreformed NATO would seriously affect Russia's interests and have a negative impact on the situation in the Caucasus.  How would you comment on this situation and how do you see the prospects for Russia-NATO relations in this connection.  When could Georgia join NATO?

First of all, I don't know what this "unreformed" NATO is.  As I just outlined, the Alliance I have the honour to lead has been engaged for many years in a process of constant and thorough transformation, in order to respond better to the security challenges of today and tomorrow.  This process includes building links to nations who may be interested in joining NATO and those who are not.

For the past decade, the NATO enlargement process has served as a means of institutionalising democratic reform and a firm commitment to collective security throughout Central and Eastern Europe.  The changes that the enlargement process has helped to bring about have benefited the new member states, they have benefited the Alliance, and they have benefited other countries in the Euro-Atlantic area, including Russia, by ensuring peace and stability throughout the region.  With Georgia, we recently launched an "Intensified Dialogue" to help Georgian officials to understand better the very stringent commitments and standards that are expected of a potential NATO member state.  This does not mean that Georgia is on the verge of joining the Alliance.  While Tbilisi clearly has this aspiration, further progress toward this goal will depend upon a clear commitment to thorough reform and basic NATO principles, such as the peaceful resolution of internal and external disputes.

Russia, too, has taken a strategic decision to intensify cooperation with NATO.  Over the past five years, we have developed unprecedented cooperation in the struggle against terrorism, theatre missile defence, airspace management and many other areas.  If President Putin and the Russian leadership believe that NATO is an indispensable strategic partner, I don't think it should be an "irritant" when Russia's neighbours come to this same conclusion.

How do you see prospects for Ukraine's accession to the Alliance after the duties of prime minister were assumed by Viktor Yanukovych, who, unlike President Viktor Yushchenko, is not an outspoken supporter of Ukraine's speedy accession to NATO?

Ukraine, like Russia, is an important strategic partner for the Alliance, and a major force contributor to NATO-led operations.  Whether and how fast the country wishes to pursue membership in the Alliance, however, is a matter for the Ukrainian people and their elected representatives to decide.

In February 2005, President Yuschchenko made clear his country's goal of NATO membership, and Allies responded by offering Ukraine an "Intensified Dialogue", aimed at informing Ukrainian government officials of the commitments this would entail, and the reforms that would be necessary to achieve this objective.  Last month, Prime Minister Yanukovych also came to NATO Headquarters, in one of his first foreign trips after taking office.  He reaffirmed that full membership in NATO is his long-term goal as well.  At the same time, he stressed the need for an extensive public information campaign, in order to allow the Ukrainian people, when the time comes, to make an informed decision on NATO membership.  I could not agree more.  He also called for increased practical cooperation, and reiterated Ukraine's commitment to key reform goals.  Here again, Allies were responsive to this call.  We are prepared to pursue further opportunities for cooperation, and to offer assistance and advice on reform wherever it can be useful.  The primary responsibility for these efforts, however, remains in the hands of the Ukrainian leadership.

Is the Alliance prepared, while deciding on its further enlargement, to take into account the fact that Russia views the so-called post-Soviet space or the CIS space as a zone of its "special vital interests"?

Of course, we are determined to ensure that the entire transformation process, including our "open door" policy, increases security throughout the Euro-Atlantic area.  Given our extensive structures of NATO-Russia cooperation, Russia has ample opportunities to express her concerns, and we are engaged in a transparent dialogue with Russia on this broad range of issues.  In fact, I expect the NATO-Russia Council to return to its ongoing dialogue on the transformation process at its next meeting.

At the same time, I think we need to acknowledge that the security environment has changed fundamentally.  At NATO, we no longer see the world in terms of military blocs and geographic "spheres of influence", and recognition of Russia's legitimate interests does not mean that we will refuse to deepen our engagement with Russia's neighbours.  A perfect example is the arrangements we have in place to support the Alliance's operation in Afghanistan, which involve the presence of military forces in several Central Asian states.  President Putin has said clearly that this operation strengthens the security of the southern rim of Russia and the CIS.

The states who aspire to membership in NATO do not seek to join an "anti-Russian" Alliance.  As partners, and perhaps one day as Allies, they are enhancing their capability to contribute in a meaningful way to multilateral solutions to shared security challenges.  Russia benefits from this as well.

In what direction does NATO plan to expand? Will it continue moving its military infrastructure to the Russian border despite concerns being insistently expressed by Russia?

The premise of your question, although widely held, is false.  Even the word "expansion" is misleading.  The Alliance is not an empire, seeking to enlarge its geographic territory.  We are a community of shared interests and values, that has proved attractive to many of our neighbours.  Our "open door" policy - that is, our readiness to consider for membership any European democracy willing and able to shoulder the burdens of NATO membership - is rooted in the Washington Treaty itself.  The initiative for joining NATO, however, comes from outside the Alliance, from those seeking the benefits of Alliance membership.

As for military infrastructure, I would let the facts speak for themselves.  We have had two rounds of enlargement since 1999, and have not seen any significant shift of NATO forces or infrastructure eastward.  In fact, Allies, new and old, have been focused on creating more modern, more deployable, and ultimately smaller military forces, on developing interoperability among themselves and with partner states' forces.  Of course, some infrastructure upgrades have been necessary to ensure such interoperability, but this has been a transparent process, well within the framework of commitments contained in the NATO-Russia Founding Act and elsewhere.

Does NATO plan to cut down the nuclear component of its force in Europe?

Any decision to change NATO's nuclear posture would have to be a collective Alliance decision, and currently there are no such plans.  I note that NATO's nuclear forces have been reduced by more than 90 per cent since the end of the Cold War. Allies remain attached to maintaining a minimum level of nuclear forces to preserve peace and stability in Europe, and to provide an essential political and military link between NATO's European and North American members.

It looks like ratification of the adjusted Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty by NATO members has been dragging on far too long and Russia has warned that it could withdraw from the treaty. When in your opinion could the situation surrounding the CFE Treaty be resolved?

The answer to this question is rather straightforward. I would very much like to see the adapted CFE Treaty enter into force as soon as possible, and so would the member states of the Alliance. For this to happen, however, all 30 CFE states need to ratify the adaptation agreement. Two of those states, Georgia and Moldova, have made clear that they will not do so as long as Russian military forces remain on their territory without their consent (a violation of Article 4 of the Treaty).

NATO supports the legal right of CFE states to decide whether or not to host foreign stationed forces. We are also pragmatists, who know that what we need is not the symbolic ratification of the adaptation agreement by one, two, or even 29 CFE states, but rather its legal entry into force, which requires the ratification of all 30. The so-called "Istanbul commitments", adopted at the OSCE Istanbul Summit in 1999, were designed to resolve a number of compliance concerns, including this one, and achieve the agreement's ratification by all CFE states. NATO Allies have supported this process, including by lending financial support to the relocation of Russian forces and to the destruction of obsolete munitions. At the same time, however, Allies made clear that the entry into force of the adapted Treaty -- and this should be our real goal -- will depend upon resolution of the outstanding "Istanbul" issues. This is true because Georgia's ratification, and Moldova's, are necessary for the treaty to enter into force. And it is true because most Allied parliaments are unlikely to overlook such serious compliance problems in considering the Adaptation Agreement. Over the past two years, much progress has been made in implementing Russia's commitments to Georgia, but unfortunately we have not seen similar progress with respect to Moldova. I intend to raise this with the Russian leadership during my visit to Moscow later this month, and it is my sincere hope that we can re-generate momentum in this process. 

Does NATO view the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the Collective Security Treaty Organization as its rivals?

As I've said, NATO does not see the world through the Cold War lens of competing military blocs.  All six members of the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) are also members of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) and the NATO Partnership for Peace (PfP), giving us extensive mechanisms for cooperation with these states.  On two occasions, the Presidency of the CSTO (Kazakhstan in 2004, Russia in 2005) has briefed the EAPC on that organisation's activities and priorities, and these briefings were received with interest by Allies and Partners.  While we have not had very much official contact with the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, we certainly do not consider that organisation to be a "rival" to the Alliance either.

Experts see little progress in Afghanistan despite the efforts of the international contingent. Some argue that NATO is being drawn deeper into the Afghan conflict. How long does NATO plan to maintain its military presence in that country?

We will stay for as long as necessary to finish the job that we set out to do when we took over the command of the UN-mandated "International Security Assistance Force" in 2003 - which is to work with the Afghan authorities and the rest of the international community in bringing peace and stability to Afghanistan, and making sure that it will never again be a safe haven for terrorists.  Our success in this effort is vital to our own security, to the future of Afghanistan and her neighbours and, if I may again agree with President Putin, to Russia.  This is why the situation in and around Afghanistan has occupied such a prominent place in the NATO-Russia political dialogue, why Russia has offered practical support -- including airlift and transit arrangements -- to Allies who are engaged there, and why we have launched innovative new forms of NATO-Russia cooperation against narcotics trafficking in Afghanistan and Central Asia.

Contrary to what the experts you are referring to may say, Afghanistan has come a long way since the bloody reign of the Taliban.  Presidential, Parliamentary and Provincial elections have all seen a very high turnout; Afghan women now play their role in public and political life; the country's economy grew by 14 per cent last year; over 4,000 kilometres of road have been rebuilt; and more than 6 million children go to school, which is six times more than in 2001.

What is important now is to sustain this progress, and that will require a concerted effort on the part of the international community.  It is crystal clear that the long-term stability of Afghanistan cannot be achieved through military means alone, and not by NATO alone.  It is vital that other nations and organisations play their part alongside the Alliance to promote reconstruction, development and institution-building, and to curb opium growing.  I will continue to emphasise the urgent need for such strong international engagement, including when I visit Russia later this month.

Does NATO count on deeper cooperation with Russia in fighting the threats of terrorism and drug trafficking coming from Afghanistan?

Yes on both counts.  Over the past four years, NATO and Russia have developed an extensive programme of cooperation against terrorism.  In December 2004, NRC Foreign Ministers approved a comprehensive NATO-Russia Action Plan on Terrorism, setting forth a comprehensive strategy for preventing terrorism, combating terrorist acts and managing their consequences.  Earlier this year, Russian naval vessels joined NATO's anti-terrorist patrols in the Mediterranean Sea in the framework of "Operation Active Endeavour", another concrete demonstration of our determination to cooperate in this area.

Cooperation against the threats posed by trafficking in Afghan narcotics is a more recent, but very promising avenue of NATO-Russia cooperation.  Since 2002, the NRC has served as a framework for extensive consultations on the security situation in and around Afghanistan, and in the context of these consultations Russia proposed that we explore concrete joint work on counter-narcotics.  Last December, NRC Foreign Ministers launched an innovative counter-narcotics training programme for personnel in Afghanistan and Central Asia.  I am pleased to say that the implementation of this programme, in cooperation with the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) is proceeding well.  In fact, the first courses in the framework of this project will be completed this month, in Turkey and at Moscow's Domodedovo Centre.

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